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Supporters of Barack Obama’s run for the Presidency of 
the United States seem to have set new records for 
anxiety in the last days before the election. In our 
house, it was a twenty-Tums week. Despite poll results 
that consistently predicted Obama would win the 
popular vote by three to five percentage points, and the 
Electoral College race by a large margin, fans of his 
candidacy seemed certain that something awful would 
happen. He was bound to lose. For a long while the 
likely scenario for the fall was of the revelation of an 
Obama skeleton so grotesque as to sink his chances 
entirely. Forget about those silly little dirt bombs like 
the rumors that he was a Muslim, Arab, a friend to 
radicals of various sorts, or that he was hard-heartedly 
unconcerned about the fate of his poor Auntie Welfare. 
No, this was to be a really nasty one that would blow 
the whole thing apart. Bigamy, perhaps, with pictures 
for proof? None of these fears proved real, of course.
By far the most common source of anxiety for the 
nail-biters was the certainty that the polls were wrong. 
Apparently, the fear was that a percentage of white 
respondents to pollsters were saying publicly that they 
were either undecided or were planning on voting for 
Obama, but once in the voting booth they would vote 
for McCain. The polling experts told us that this had 
happened before, and has come to be termed the 
“Bradley effect.”“ In 1982 Tom Bradley, the African-
American, Democratic Mayor of Los Angeles, lost his 
race for the Governorship of California to George 
Deukmejian, a white Republican. Polls predicted that 
Bradley would win comfortably, but he narrowly lost.  
It was suggested in some post-election studies that 
white voters had voted for Bradley at a lower rate than 
they had indicated in polls, and that a statistically 
unlikely percent of those who had said they were 
undecided, ultimately voted for Deukmejian. 
Feeding the fears of a Bradley effect in the Obama-
McCain race was the list of other contests between 
black and white candidates in which vote tallies were 
consistently lower for black candidates than polls had 
predicted. Among the black candidates who appear to 
have experienced this phenomenon were Harold 
Washington in his 1983 bid to be Mayor of Chicago, 
Jesse Jackson in the 1988 Democratic presidential 
primary, David Dinkins’ race for Mayor of New York in 
1989, Douglas Wilder in the 1989 race for Governor of 
Virginia, and Carol Mosely Braun in her 1992 Senate 
race in Illinois. 
When Obama won the election, it seemed that the fears 
of his supporters had been unfounded. Polls just before 
the election had predicted that he would win by 7.5% in 
the national popular vote. He won by about 1% less 
than that, well within the small (2%) margin of error 
that even polls using massive samples must accept. 
Perhaps white Americans who told pollsters that they 
planned to vote for Obama actually did. 
But why should Obama supporters waste a perfectly 
good fear of disaster on rational interpretations of the 
outcome?  A closer, and more tortured, view of vote 
patterns allows us to have our victory and fear it too. 
Perhaps there was a real Bradley effect, but Obama  
won anyway.
We sociologists are all too familiar with the forces that 
underlie the Bradley effect. It’s called “social desirability 
effect,” the tendency of a survey respondent to tell the 
interviewer what he or she thinks is socially acceptable 
rather than the truth. We have lots of evidence that this 
happens in all sorts of surveys, including political polls. 
For example, Americans routinely exaggerate how often 
they attend church and minimize how much alcohol 
they drink in order to reflect what they think are 
American standards of behavior. In studies of racial 
attitudes, some of our best data about social desirability 
effect goes back at least eighty years.
Beginning in 1926, the sociologist Emory Bogardus 
started collecting survey data on racial attitudes in 
America. He devised a measure of prejudice in which he 
asked a sample of white college students to indicate 
how “socially close” they would allow members of 
specific groups. For example, asking a respondent to 
think of black Americans in general, would the 
respondent allow such a person to marry into his or  
her family? If not, then would close friendship be ok?  
No? How about letting a black American live in the 
neighborhood with you? The actual social distance 
scale items looked like the following.
 As close relatives by marriage  
 As my close personal friends  
 As neighbors on the same street  
 As co-workers in the same occupation  
 As citizens in my country  
 As only visitors in my country 
 Would exclude from my country 
In 1926 Bogardus, using thirty target groups for his 
study, found clear patterns of prejudice in his sample of 
white college students. They would allow very close 
social distance to white, western European “targets” 
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such as white, English people. However, as the named 
groups of people moved farther east and south of 
England, and as their skin colors got darker and their 
cultures less “Western”, their social distance scores 
declined. Mediterranean groups were less acceptable 
than western Europeans, and African and Asian groups 
least acceptable of all. Bogardus repeated his studies in 
1946, 1956 and 1966 using the same sorts of college 
student samples. Though he found that levels of 
prejudice declined over time, the same overall pattern 
of group preferences remained. These patterns were 
extremely stable, withstanding even cataclysmic events 
such as World War II.  For example, the standing of 
Germans took a hit in the 1946 data. Germans had 
dropped four places, from their standing at seventh of 
thirty groups in 1926, to tenth place. But only ten years 
later, the 1956 data had them back in eighth position on 
the list.  I believe it is a measure of the extreme stability 
of these social distance rankings that fighting a 
desperate war against Germany only diminished their 
relative standing by a few places in the estimation of 
the white Americans in Bogardus’ study. 
Scientists value highly such data that tracks important 
phenomena over time. It is rare that we have the 
resources and foresight to collect it consistently. So 
 it seemed strange to me that after 1966 no one collected 
social distance data using Bogardus’ scale. (Bogardus 
died in 1973, but he had lots of graduate students and 
colleagues who could have continued the research.)   
The reason, it is clear, was the rise of social desirability 
effect. 
After World War II a number of intense cultural and 
political movements combined to influence what was 
socially acceptable for Americans to say and do. For 
example, stating that women should stay at home, or 
that black Americans were best suited to physical labor, 
would have raised few eyebrows before the 1960’s. But 
after the widespread successes of the movements for 
racial civil rights and sexual equality in America, such 
comments became increasingly unacceptable here. The 
effect was clear in the attempt to measure prejudice 
with Bogardus’ scale. Respondents were no longer 
willing to state that one group was preferable to 
another, even if they privately held such beliefs.
This brings us back to the Bradley effect. Pollsters were 
well aware that Americans who would not vote for a 
black candidate would likely not admit it. In order to 
appear to be without racial prejudice, they would lie 
about their intentions. So when Obama won the 
election by about the percentage that the polls had 
predicted, those of us who had been tracking the life of 
social desirability effect in America thought it might 
have finally expired. I say, not so much.
It is entirely possible that this election had the usual 
proportion of people who told pollsters that they were 
undecided or intending to vote for Obama, then voted 
against him. It’s just that this fact was masked by a 
number of other, unprecedented voting patterns. 
Among these were the following sorts of voters. There 
were, apparently, many who voted for Obama because 
he was black. They told pollsters that they could help 
make history for America by putting a minority 
candidate into office. Increased participation among 
black and Latino voters who voted disproportionately 
for Obama influenced the outcome. And there were 
young voters, who also voted disproportionately for 
Obama. In fact, young voters were underrepresented in 
pre-election polling because polling organizations had 
poor access to cell phone numbers in their random-digit 
dialing sampling procedures. 
So, from this sociologist’s point of view, the Bradley 
effect is probably alive and well in America. There has 
been too long a history of documented social desirabil-
ity effect in other research to conclude that the election 
of a black American to the presidency is evidence of its 
demise. And, lest you think that I am sorry to come to 
this conclusion, I want to make it clear that I think the 
unwillingness of Americans to publicly express their 
prejudices is a very good thing. To me it is a measure of 
our national disapproval of group hatreds. How can 
that be anything but a source of pride in our culture?  
—William c. Levin is Professor of Sociology and 
Associate editor of the Bridgewater Review.
PReSIdenTIaL eLeCTIOn 2008 
OBaMa/BIden CaMPaIgn  
POLLIng ReSPOnSe FORM
Instructions for field interviewers:  After reading the  
following question to a respondent, check one of the spaces  
that follow.
“If the election for President of the United States were being  
held  today, for which of the following candidates would  
you be most likely to vote?”  
__ Respondent will vote for McCain/Palin
__ Respondent will vote for Obama/Biden
__ Respondent says he/she will vote for Obama/ 
 Biden, but is wearing a McCain/Palin button
__ Respondent says he/she will vote for Obama/ 
 Biden, but has his or her fingers crossed
__ Respondent says he/she will vote for Obama/ 
 Biden, but is smirking
__ Respondent says he/she will vote for Obama/ 
 Biden, but  is rolling on the floor helpless with mirth
